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Academic and popular views of the keiretsu, as postwar Japanese corpo-
rate groups are sometimes called, range from complete dismissal to admi-
ration of their inﬂuence, whether it is alleged to enhance economic growth
or to restrict entry into the Japanese market. During the 1990s, cross-
shareholding arrangements within groups and ties between ailing ﬁnancial
institutions and their client ﬁrms have often been mentioned as potential
impediments to structural change, especially with respect to the introduc-
tion of market-based means of corporate ﬁnance and governance.
The present chapter has three objectives. The ﬁrst is to review the litera-
ture on corporate groups in Japan and elsewhere, summarizing the evi-
dence on the economic roles (if any) corporate groups have played in the
Japanese economy. The second objective is to present, for the ﬁrst time, a
comparison of Japanese groups and corporate groups in other developed
and developing countries. The main conclusion emerging from this com-
parison is that Japanese groups, while similar to groups elsewhere in some
respects, are diﬀerent in their risk and return characteristics. The third ob-
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ments and suggestions.jective is to describe the evolution of Japan’s groups since the mid-1970s
and to examine whether or not groups constitute an impediment to struc-
tural change in Japan.
With some exceptions, there is limited evidence of the economic impor-
tance of corporate groups in postwar Japan. There is also little to suggest
that groups have had a major impact on growth rates of particular indus-
tries, and no evidence that Japanese groups (unlike those in other coun-
tries) enjoy any particular political clout. It is therefore unlikely that cor-
porate groups will constitute an impediment to structural change.
Powerful, family-controlled, pyramidal groups (zaibatsu) existed in
Japan from the late nineteenth century to just after World War II. Our fo-
cus here, however, is on corporate groups in postwar Japan. These are usu-
ally divided into two types. The ﬁrst consists of ﬁrms operating in many in-
dustries with large ﬁnancial institutions (a city bank, a trust bank, and
insurance companies) at the core. These are variously termed horizontal,
ﬁnancial, or bank-centered groups. There are six major groups of this type,
three with zaibatsu roots.
The second type consists of a large manufacturer and related suppliers
within the same industry or in closely related sectors. These are often de-
scribed as vertical or manufacturer-centered groups. Examples include
Toyota or Hitachi.
The discussion here focuses mostly on bank-centered groups. First, I re-
view the literature on corporate groups in general, and then evaluate the
empirical evidence on the economic importance of Japan’s corporate
groups. I then make a cross-sectional comparison between Japanese cor-
porate groups and those in other countries, and describe the evolution of
groups in Japan over time, including their prospects.
9.1 Identifying Corporate Groups
The criteria used to deﬁne the boundaries of a group and to identify
members vary considerably across countries and studies (Khanna 2000).
In most countries, including Japan, membership is typically informal. (Ex-
ceptions include Italy, where the law identiﬁes “common control” [see
Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques 2001], and Chile, where groups are legal en-
tities.)
Still, the literature has struggled to provide a deﬁnition—or at least def-
initions—for each country. Leﬀ (1978, 673) put forward “a group of com-
panies that does business in diﬀerent markets under a common adminis-
trative or ﬁnancial control,” but this is clearly inappropriate in postwar
Japan, where groups lack common control. Strachan (1976) deﬁnes a
group as a long-term association of ﬁrms and the people who own and
manage them, and points out that a group cannot be identiﬁed purely on
the basis of a single metric. The criteria used to identify membership in
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tions among member ﬁrms.
9.1.1 Origins of Japanese Groups
The prewar and wartime economy of Japan was dominated by large, di-
versiﬁed conglomerates (zaibatsu). At war’s end the four major zaibatsu
represented about a quarter of paid-in capital and much larger shares in ﬁ-
nance and heavy industries (Hoshi and Kashyap 2001, 69, box 3.5; Hadley
1970). The zaibatsuwere family-owned conglomerates, controlled through
holding companies that in turn held a large number of shares in a ﬁrst tier
of subsidiaries. First-tier subsidiaries controlled a second tier of compa-
nies, and so forth, forming a pyramid of ﬁrms. Horizontal ownership and
personnel ties between group ﬁrms were also common.1
Following Japan’s defeat in 1945, the U.S. occupation authorities
(Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers [SCAP]) regarded the zai-
batsu as an important part of the Japanese social and economic structure
that was responsible for the war. In particular, the market power of the zai-
batsu and the tremendous wealth of the founding families made the disso-
lution of the conglomerates one of the ﬁrst and most important targets of
the Allied Occupation reforms.
The zaibatsu dissolution reforms started soon after the end of the war
and ended around 1950. The holding companies were dismantled and new
ones prohibited by law, the founding families were stripped of their shares,
and many of the incumbent managers were purged and barred from cor-
porate oﬃce. The resulting change of ownership was of enormous scale:
Some estimates suggest that over 40 percent of all corporate assets in Japan
changed hands (Bisson 1954). The shares transferred were resold by the
Holding Companies Liquidation Commission (HCLC) using several
methods designed to guarantee dispersion of ownership structure (see
Hadley 1970, 181–87). Indeed, following the conclusion of the reforms,
shareholding by individuals in Japan reached an all time high of approxi-
mately 70 percent around 1949 (Aoki 1988).
Despite the hopes of the Occupation, the newly created ownership struc-
ture proved unstable. With the reopening of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in
1949, individuals who received shares during the reforms (especially com-
pany employees and residents of cities where the companies operated) be-
gan to sell, and individual shareholding began to decline. By the early
1950s a new ownership structure had emerged: Most companies were
owned by other companies and by ﬁnancial institutions, most notably
large commercial banks (“city banks”).
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1. Okazaki (2001) argues that the zaibatsu were not powerful enough to dominate the
Japanese economy before the start of World War II, but during the war they increased mar-
ket power and played an important role in providing military equipment and supplies to the
Japanese Imperial Army.Ownership ties were sometimes part of reciprocal cross-shareholdings,
often along the lines of the former zaibatsuand especially among what had
been the three largest: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo (see Hoshi 1994;
Yafeh 1995). These ties were further reinforced in the late 1960s, and “new”
groups centered on major (city) banks were formed (Dai-Ichi Bank and
Nippon Kangyo Bank, which later merged to form the Dai-Ichi Kangyo
[DKB] group; Fuji; and Sanwa).
There are several possible reasons why the period of dispersed owner-
ship was so short. Individuals may have been too poor and too risk averse
to wish to hold equity, and preferred to increase their consumption or save
in the form of bank accounts rather than hold shares.
Another reason asserted by many authors (e.g., Miyajima 1994) is that
the reformed ﬁrms were exposed to hostile takeovers once their zaibatsu
shareholders were removed. Low equity prices soon after the war are
posited to have made Japanese ﬁrms easy targets. To prevent this, man-
agers sought to establish a friendly, stable ownership structure dominated
by ﬁrms associated with each other in the prewar period. However, it is not
clear who the potential raiders could have been.
An alternative explanation for the short life of extensive individual own-
ership is simply that it was ineﬃcient. Yafeh (1995) shows that, other things
equal, the greater the percentage of a ﬁrm’s outstanding shares expropri-
ated and resold by the Occupation, the worse was the ﬁrm’s performance
in the early 1950s. This is consistent with the view that large shareholders
play an important role in corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).
Concentrated family ownership did not reappear, apparently because the
old wealth of the prewar period had been destroyed by the reforms.
The eﬃciency argument is less likely to explain the reinforcement of
cross-shareholding in the 1960s. Then, some fear of hostile takeovers was
plausible as Japan opened to foreign capital.
9.1.2 Who is a Group Member?
Unlike the prewar zaibatsu, postwar groups in Japan have no central
control, and identifying aﬃliation with a group is not straightforward.
Core members typically take part in presidents’ clubs, which are regular
meetings of senior executives. Members of these clubs are easy to identify
and constitute about 10 percent of all listed manufacturing ﬁrms in Japan
(Weinstein and Yafeh 1995).
Beyond the presidents’ club, researchers have used a variety of measures
to identify group members. Commonly used deﬁnitions are those of three
major publications: Keizai Chosa Kyokai’s Keiretsu no Kenkyu, Toyo
Keizai’s Kigyo Keiretsu Soran, and Dodwell Marketing Consultants’ In-
dustrial Groupings in Japan. These weigh various aspects of the relation-
ship between a ﬁrm and other group members, most notably the extent and
stability of cross-shareholding arrangements, and the extent and stability
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institutions. The frequency of personnel exchange appears to be a rela-
tively less important component.
The existing weighting schemes (and the corresponding data sources)
usually concur as far as the identiﬁcation of core group members is con-
cerned, but may diﬀer considerably in deﬁning the boundaries of groups.
Thus, Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) ﬁnd the correlation between the lists of
members identiﬁed by diﬀerent sources to be not very high, although all
commonly used deﬁnitions suggest that group-aﬃliated companies consti-
tute some 40 percent to 50 percent of all listed manufacturing ﬁrms. Gib-
son (1995), looking at bank-ﬁrm ties in the early 1990s without reference
to groups, suggests that several plausible methods agree on the identity of
the main bank of most companies, although his methodology is not de-
signed for identifying members in bank-centered groups.
While credit relationships within groups are fairly easy to interpret, the
prevalence and signiﬁcance of equity ties is more controversial. The extent
of equity ties reported by diﬀerent sources varies with the group deﬁnition
used. Mitsubishi and Sumitomo presidents’ club member ﬁrms had
around 25 percent of their equity held by other group ﬁrms in 1990,
whereas the corresponding ﬁgures for other groups hover around 15 per-
cent to 16 percent (Sheard 1997). Figures for non-presidents’ clubs ﬁrms
are typically substantially lower.
Most of the equity ties within the groups involve the group’s ﬁnancial in-
stitutions (banks and insurance companies). By contrast, equity ties be-
tween manufacturing ﬁrms are usually low (with equity stakes that are of-
ten less than 1 percent). The meaning of these ties, which are unusually
stable in spite of their small size, has been harder to interpret (see Flath
1993; Miwa and Ramseyer 2001a; and further discussion below).
The empirical literature on Japan has often treated bank-ﬁrm relations
and group aﬃliation as one and the same. To a great extent, this is because
the available deﬁnitions of group aﬃliation focus on ties with the group’s
main bank. Thus, a large number of empirical studies actually rely on
group data to suggest that long term bank-ﬁrm relationships may matter
for corporate governance, mitigation of informational asymmetries be-
tween the ﬁrm and its ﬁnanciers, and the resolution of ﬁnancial distress.
(On the Japanese main bank system, see Aoki and Patrick 1994; Hoshi and
Kashyap 2001, especially chap. 4).
9.2 Reasons for Groups to Exist
The literature on corporate groups has so far not reached an agreement
on the most important reasons for the ubiquity of groups around the
world. This section therefore begins with an evaluation of positive expla-
nations for the existence of groups (viewing them as eﬃcient solutions to
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ceeds to discuss negative views of corporate groups (such as political rent-
seeking and expropriation of minority shareholders) and to examine their
applicability to Japan.
9.2.1 Reducing Transaction Costs
Corporate groups may be important for reducing transaction costs as-
sociated with intragroup trade. Applying this idea to Japan, Flath (1993)
argues that cross-shareholding arrangements help reduce moral hazard
risks among trading partners, thus facilitating transaction-speciﬁc invest-
ments. Yet empirical evidence in support of this argument is rather scarce
(Flath provides some), and it appears that the volume of intragroup trade
within the bank-centered groups is rather low. Sheard (1997) estimates av-
erage intragroup sales at about 2 percent, excluding the group’s general
trading company, which accounts for another 6  percent. Odagiri (1992,
182) reports that in 1981, on average, 20 percent of a group ﬁrm’s sales and
12 percent of its purchases were within-group transactions.
By contrast, intragroup trade and transaction-speciﬁc investments may
be a major factor explaining the structure and performance of manufac-
turer-centered (vertical) groups, where joint development of new products
and just-in-time supply of inputs are crucial. Indeed, there is substantial
evidence that manufacturer-centered groups combine insurance and in-
centives in a way that is designed to reduce hold-up problems through
long-term relations without full vertical integration (Kawasaki and
MacMillan 1987; Asanuma 1989; Fujimoto 1999).
9.2.2 Coordinating Investment
Groups may facilitate major investments by providing a mechanism for
coordination across ﬁrms and industries. They may therefore be of help in
orchestrating a “big push.” Thus, Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973) view the
zaibatsu as an important component in prewar Japan’s ability to absorb
foreign technology, which could be spread across group members.
Goto (1982) argues that the reason groups are observed in a market
economy like Japan is their ability to coordinate research and development
(R&D) and new investments. A weaker formulation of this hypothesis is
that groups share information about investment opportunities, even if
group members carry out investment decisions independently. Although
this is not impossible, this conjecture is hard to test empirically and has
never been formally examined.
Systematic evidence on joint investments and R&D among members of
Japan’s postwar groups is not available. There is little in the literature on in-
terﬁrm coordination in R&D and technology absorption to suggest that
the bank-centered groups have played a particularly important role in this
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groups, for which, see Branstetter 2000; Okada 2001).
Montalvo and Yafeh (1994) ﬁnd that group-aﬃliated ﬁrms signed more
licensing agreements to import foreign technology into Japan in the late
1970s. There are several possible interpretations for this result, however. It
is possible that group-aﬃliated ﬁrms enjoyed easy access to capital from ﬁ-
nancial institutions within the group. It is also possible that group ﬁrms
signed more licensing contracts because they were less involved in inde-
pendent R&D activity, perhaps as a result of pressure by the group’s main
bank to adopt low-risk investment strategies.
Using survey data from the late 1990s, Mayer, Schoors, and Yafeh (2002)
note that venture capital funds in Japan often are owned by ﬁrms related
to each other, as part of one of the groups or otherwise. They do not dis-
cuss the impact of this characteristic on fund performance.
9.2.3 Substituting for Missing Institutions
Khanna and Palepu (1999) suggest groups in India and other develop-
ing countries make up for missing institutions, such as those enforcing
property rights, as well as markets for skilled labor, management, and cap-
ital. This, they argue, is a plausible explanation for the evidence of superior
performance of group members in India and other emerging markets, es-
pecially when groups exceed a certain size (or diversiﬁcation) threshold.
This extended suggestions in the early descriptive literature that groups
made up most notably for imperfect capital markets (e.g., Leﬀ 1978). Per-
otti and Gelfer (2001) argue that Russian ﬁnancial-industrial groups
(FIGs) manage an internal capital market that may add value in the face of
ineﬃcient external capital markets in that country. In addition, there is
some evidence that internal capital markets in the Korean jaebol(i.e., busi-
ness groups) create value (Chang and Hong 2000).
Applied to skilled labor and management, the missing-institution argu-
ment could perhaps be related to zaibatsu, which trained a generation of
prewar Japanese executives, but it is more diﬃcult to apply it to the post-
war experience, and it is not supported by any Japan-speciﬁc study.
Applied to underdeveloped capital markets, the missing-institution ar-
gument is undermined by the absence of evidence indicating eﬃcient allo-
cation of capital within the Japanese corporate groups, whose growth rates
and other measures of performance have not been superior to those of
nongroup ﬁrms. Nevertheless, some relations between the postwar corpo-
rate groups and certain aspects of capital markets (risk sharing and corpo-
rate governance) are discussed below. In addition, Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharsfetin (1990, 1991), argue that investment decisions of group-
aﬃliated companies are less sensitive to their cash ﬂow positions than in-
vestment decisions of nongroup ﬁrms, and also that some unnecessary
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idence that groups do make up for some deﬁciencies of imperfect capital
markets in the allocation of capital.
9.2.4 Providing Mutual Insurance
One function of capital markets that has been associated with corporate
groups is the provision of mutual insurance opportunities for member
ﬁrms. This idea originates in the literature on Japanese groups, where sev-
eral studies suggest that groups provide an organizational mechanism
through which risks are shared. A theoretical formulation of this hypothe-
sis by Aoki (1988) suggests that employees with ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capi-
tal cannot easily protect themselves against adverse shocks and therefore
appreciate risk reduction through ﬁrm relations with other ﬁrms within a
corporate group, and especially with the group’s main bank.
Nakatani (1984) provides empirical support for the claim that Japanese
corporate groups provide a low-proﬁt and low-volatility environment.
Kashyap (1989) suggests that the low volatility of proﬁts documented by
Nakatani is a result of intragroup trade relations (and therefore is not a
characteristic of ﬁnal-good producers within the groups).
There is evidence on a particular form of risk sharing under the auspices
of the main bank within the big-six groups, namely, assistance during ﬁ-
nancial distress. For example, Sheard (1989) documents a variety of cases
in which banks rescued ailing clients, typically within their group and of-
ten with the assistance of other group members. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001,
chap. 5) discuss bank interventions.
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argue that members of bank-centered
Japanese groups adopt low-risk investment strategies, although the moti-
vation for this behavior is, in their view, related not to risk sharing but to
the (excessive) inﬂuence that the group bank and other creditors exert on
group ﬁrms. Khanna and Yafeh (2001) conduct a battery of risk-sharing
tests among corporate groups in Japan and elsewhere, and ﬁnd consistent
evidence for mutual insurance among member ﬁrms of Japanese (and Ko-
rean) corporate groups, in contrast with most of the other countries they
examine.
Thus, while there is limited evidence on other possible economic roles of
corporate groups in Japan, the risk-sharing hypothesis does enjoy some
empirical support. Furthermore, this mutual insurance feature seems to
distinguish Japanese groups from most corporate groups in emerging mar-
kets. The sociological literature has also emphasized risk sharing within
Japan’s corporate groups (e.g., Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian 1996).
But, the evidence on risk sharing within corporate groups in Japan has not
been unchallenged (see Beason 1998; Kang and Stulz 2000; Miwa and
Ramseyer 2001a, b). Further discussion on risk and return within groups
is included below.
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Another capital market function that has sometimes been associated
with Japanese corporate groups is corporate governance. For example,
group members are viewed as important in the theoretical corporate gov-
ernance model of Berglof and Perotti (1994). Yet, overall, empirical sup-
port for the special role of groups in corporate governance appears to be
limited. There is much evidence on the role of main banks, typically within
corporate groups, in disciplining managers of distressed ﬁrms and in re-
structuring their operations (Yafeh 2000; Hoshi and Kashyap 2001). There
is also some evidence on the role of large shareholders (often part of the
group) in corporate governance, again mostly with respect to poorly per-
forming companies (Kang and Shivdasani 1995, 1997). Yafeh and Yosha
(2003) provide some evidence for the role of large shareholders in corpo-
rate governance in companies whose performance is normal. There is very
little to suggest that corporate groups contribute to corporate governance
beyond the roles played by the group banks and by large shareholders (al-
though it is perhaps possible to argue that the group provides a framework
in which main banks and large shareholders operate).
9.2.6 Monopoly Power
The fear that groups with deep pockets may drive more focused (smaller)
competitors out of the market is not new, and was one of the motivations
for the Occupation’s dissolution of the zaibatsu(Yafeh 1995). While groups
in some countries (e.g., Korea) do appear to dominate markets, the general
evidence on the relation between market power and corporate groups is
weak. Encaoua and Jacquemin (1982) ﬁnd little evidence of monopoliza-
tion by French groups. Lawrence (1993) argues that Japanese groups con-
stitute a barrier to entry because they prefer to purchase inputs from other
group members and thus restrict competition by foreign ﬁrms. The evi-
dence on the limited extent of intragroup trade is inconsistent with this ar-
gument and, moreover, Lawrence’s empirical evidence in support of this
argument is not fully convincing (Saxonhouse 1993).
Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) use an industrial organization framework to
examine the relation between the intensity of competition and the market
share of Japanese bank-centered groups. They suggest that, if anything,
group members tend to compete more aggressively than other ﬁrms; al-
though ﬁerce competition may well constitute a barrier to entry, there is no
evidence of collusion among group members at the expense of outsiders.
9.2.7 Political Rent Seeking
As in prewar Japan, the origins of corporate groups and their initial
growth in many countries were inﬂuenced by close ties with the govern-
ment. The zaibatsu emerged in the 1880s as part of the Matsukata privati-
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government contracts and procurement. Groups in India emerged after in-
dependence when businessman with government ties acquired assets that
had belonged to the British. In Korea, the jaebol were formed under the
auspices of the government and started oﬀ by using assets left at the end of
the Japanese colonial period. Such close government ties have prompted
accusations that corporate groups derive beneﬁts from rent seeking and
government favors, and are therefore ineﬃcient. Fisman (2001) ﬁnds ex-
plicit evidence for this in Indonesia.
There are no studies linking postwar Japanese groups with corruption or
speciﬁc government favors and contracts. Industrial policy was notoriously
conducted at the industry level and no ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidies were given
(Johnson 1982). Corruption scandals have not involved group-aﬃliated
ﬁrms more than other corporations, and corporate groups have never been
mentioned as part of any political party’s constituency. (For the ruling Lib-
eral Democratic Party (LDP), these traditionally are thought of as being
farmers, small shop owners, and perhaps the construction industry).
One measure of government-business ties in Japan is the practice of
amakudari, the transfer of bureaucrats from the government to the private
sector. Van Rixtel (2002) ﬁnds that ﬁrms within corporate groups are less
likely to receive amakudari than other ﬁrms.
9.2.8 Expropriation of Minority Shareholders
A growing amount of literature has blamed corporate groups with the
expropriation of minority shareholders. Claessens et al. (1999) argue that
groups are associated with minority shareholder expropriation in Asia.
Similarly, Johnson et al. (2000), as well as Bertrand, Mehta, and Mul-
lainathan (2002), view groups as institutions that are associated with poor
protection of property rights and enable “tunneling” of funds from minor-
ity shareholders to the controlling party. This argument is unlikely to be
particularly relevant to Japan, most notably because Japanese groups do
not have a controlling shareholder and also because, according to the com-
monly used La Porta et al. (1998) classiﬁcation, the legal protection of mi-
nority shareholders in Japan is, by international standards, not bad. Even
though some cases in which unhappy Japanese shareholders sued corrupt
corporations have been reported in the press, there is little systematic evi-
dence to suggest that group-aﬃliated ﬁrms in Japan are particularly prone
to minority shareholder expropriation.2
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2. In chapter six of this volume, Ando, Christelis, and Miyagawa observe that Japanese
shareholders are in a weak position relative to management, which, they argue, has been able
to pursue non-proﬁt-maximization objectives. The concern here is in the spirit of the “tun-
neling” literature (Johnson et al. 2000), focusing on how insider, usually majority, sharehold-
ers treat other shareholders, especially within corporate groups. According to the standard
measures of statutory legal protection used in the recent ﬁnance literature, Japanese minor-
ity shareholders enjoy many of the legal protection measures of common law countries.9.2.9 Summary
Much has been written on Japan’s corporate groups, and yet concrete ev-
idence (positive or negative) on their economic importance is surprisingly
scarce. Only the groups’ role in mutual risk sharing has received some em-
pirical support. In addition, there is much evidence that large shareholders
(often within a corporate group) and main bank relationships (also typi-
cally within a corporate group) are often important for corporate gover-
nance, although there is little to suggest the importance of the group struc-
ture per se. It is therefore possible to conclude that the limited evidence on
Japan’s corporate groups is weakly consistent with the positive views of
corporate groups as substitutes for missing (capital market and other) in-
stitutions.
9.3 Comparing Groups in Japan and Elsewhere
This section compares Japan’s corporate groups with groups in other
countries. Of course, they may diﬀer substantially in structure and mode of
operation but, at the same time, have many common features (most no-
tably cross-shareholding). The main thrust of the comparison is that
Japanese groups are not unique in structure, but are perhaps special in
their low risk and low return characteristics. Because of data constraints,
and perhaps also because groups are less common in developed economies,
most of the countries included in this comparison are emerging markets,
although some comparisons will be made with Italian groups.
9.3.1 A First Look
Table 9.1 describes corporate groups in Japan and in a several emerging
markets. The fraction of ﬁrms classiﬁed as group aﬃliated ranges from
about a ﬁfth in Chile and Venezuela to about two-thirds in Indonesia. In
Italy, more than half of all industrial companies belong to pyramidal
groups (Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques 2001). In Japan, members of presi-
dents’ clubs account for fewer than 10 percent of listed manufacturing
ﬁrms, whereas other group deﬁnitions (for example, those of Dodwell
Marketing Consultants and Keiretsu no Kenyu) identify close to a half of
all listed manufacturing ﬁrms as members. Thus, in terms of overall preva-
lence groups, Japan does not seem to be diﬀerent.
Table 9.1 also indicates that in Japan, as well as in virtually all the other
countries for which data are available (Turkey being the only exception),
group-aﬃliated ﬁrms are larger than unaﬃliated ﬁrms. Diﬀerence in me-
dian size between presidents’ clubs members and other ﬁrms are somewhat
bigger than diﬀerences in means—the mean size of presidents’ clubs mem-
bers is about seven times that of nonmembers. The mean size of ﬁrms clas-
siﬁed as group aﬃliated by Dodwell is about 50 percent larger than the size
of unaﬃliated ﬁrms.
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predominantly group aﬃliated: Over 99 percent of ﬁrms with over 1,000
employees are group members, as are about 89 percent of the ﬁrms with
500 to 1,000 employees. By contrast, less than 40 percent of small ﬁrms
(fewer than 100 employees) are group members (Bianchi, Bianco, and En-
riques 2001).
9.3.2 Group Organization and Location Across Industries
Japan’s postwar corporate groups are diﬀerent from groups in many
other countries in the conspicuous absence of a centralized decision-
making mechanism. Without holding companies (legally banned between
the end of World War II and 1998) or other formal joint control mecha-
nism, it is hard to expect groups to coordinate their activities very exten-
sively. This is in sharp contrast with Italian groups, where an elaborate
pyramid structure guarantees centralized control; Indeed, Bianchi,
Bianco, and Enriques (2001) argue that the very reason for the prevalence
of groups in Italy is to generate a wedge between control and cash ﬂow
rights.
Although the degree of cohesiveness of groups varies across countries
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Table 9.1 Corporate Groups: Japan and Emerging Markets
Percent Relative
Country and Period in Groupa Sizeb
Argentina 1990–1997 44 5.5
Brazil 1990–1997 47 2.5
Chile 1989–1996 22 18.7
India 1990–1997 33 4.4
Indonesia 1993–1995 65 2.8
Israel 1993–1995 23 5.0
Italy, early 1990s  50 n.a.c
Korea 1991–1995 51 3.9
Mexico 1988–1997 35 2.3
Philippines 1992–1997 25 3.4
Taiwan 1990–1997 44 2.0
Thailand 1992–1997 62 2.3
Turkey 1988–1997 52 1.0
Prewar Japan (largest three groups) 1932–1943 29 6.8
Postwar Japan (presidents’ clubs) 1977–1992 9 8.5
Postwar Japan (Dodwell deﬁnition) 1977–1992 39 2.0
Sources:Khanna and Yafeh (2001), except Italy, which is from Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques
(2001).
Note: n.a. = not available.
aPercentage of ﬁrms aﬃliated with groups.
bMedian size of group-aﬃliated ﬁrms divided by median size of unaﬃliated ﬁrms.
cGroup ﬁrms are much larger.and across groups, in many emerging markets, including Korea, groups
seem to be far more centrally controlled than they are in Japan. Thus, the
loose structure of Japan’s postwar groups appears to be distinctly diﬀerent
than the structure of groups in many emerging markets (and also in sharp
contrast with the prewar period).
The spread of groups across manufacturing industries is displayed in
table 9.2. (There are insuﬃcient data to include services). Perhaps the most
notable pattern is the absence of a clear pattern of group location across in-
dustries, although there is some evidence that groups in several countries
tend to locate in somewhat more capital-intensive industries. This pattern
is reminiscent of the zaibatsu in prewar Japan, although it is far from uni-
versally true.
Postwar Japanese group ﬁrms seem to be evenly spread across many sec-
tors (the so-called one set policy). This pattern is not unique to Japan; for
example, Chilean groups also seem to exhibit this tendency, although their
structure appears to be less complete than that of the Japanese groups. In
terms of sales, relatively more capital-intensive sectors, such as metals and
chemicals, seem to be particularly important for Japan’s corporate groups
in terms of both the fraction of total group assets and group ﬁrms’ market
shares. These sectors are generally important for the Japanese economy as
a whole, so this ﬁnding is hardly surprising.
The importance of services, most notably ﬁnancial services, varies
tremendously among groups in diﬀerent countries. Whereas in some coun-
tries groups’ entry into the ﬁnancial services industry has been restricted
(e.g., Korea), in other countries services constitute the bulk of group ac-
tivity. Thus, it appears that, aside from the loose control, the structure and
organization of Japan’s corporate groups is not unique.
9.3.3 Risk and Return
Table 9.3 displays simple proﬁt rates and proﬁt volatility statistics for
group and nongroup member ﬁrms in Japan and elsewhere. In six of twelve
countries in the table, proﬁt rates and proﬁt volatility are lower for group-
aﬃliated ﬁrms, although not always in a statistically signiﬁcant manner.
Japanese corporate groups are among those characterized by low risk
and low proﬁtability, although diﬀerences in medians appear to be small
and not statistically signiﬁcant. Diﬀerences in mean proﬁtability (3.7 per-
cent for members of presidents’ clubs versus 4.0 percent for other ﬁrms)
are also statistically insigniﬁcant, although diﬀerences in mean standard
deviation of proﬁtability are statistically signiﬁcant (standard deviation of
operating proﬁtability of 2.4 for presidents’ clubs members versus 2.9 for
other ﬁrms). Using the Dodwell deﬁnition, group ﬁrms exhibit signiﬁ-
cantly lower mean proﬁtability, as well as signiﬁcantly lower mean and me-
dian standard deviation of proﬁtability relative to other ﬁrms.
The characterization of the Japanese groups as providing a low-risk and




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.low-return environment is borne out in more sophisticated econometric
tests of the mutual insurance hypothesis conducted in Khanna and Yafeh
(2001). They report that Japanese corporate groups (members of presi-
dents’ clubs) seem to provide mutual insurance for members’ ﬁrms ac-
cording to ﬁve of the six tests they conducted.3
This is hardly true for most groups around the world: Although groups
in Korea and a few other countries also seem to provide a low-risk envi-
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Table 9.3 Risk and Return Characteristics of Corporate Groups













Prewar Japan (three largest zaibatsu)– 0.9 –2.7
Postwar Japan (presidents’ clubs) –0.2 –0.1
Postwar Japan (Dodwell) –0.2 –0.2**
Source: See Khanna and Yafeh (2001).
Note: Data are for the year of maximal coverage for each country (for Japan, 1987 proﬁtabil-
ity, and standard deviation based on 1977–1992) and exclude ﬁrms with proﬁt rates above 100
percent or below –100 percent. Signiﬁcance levels for the comparisons of medians are based
on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
aDiﬀerence in median ROA between group and nongroup ﬁrms.
bDiﬀerence in median of standard deviation of ROA between group and nongroup ﬁrms.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
3. There are six tests: (a) A benchmark ordinary least squares (OLS) regression where the
standard deviation of operating proﬁtability is regressed on a number of control variables and
a group aﬃliation dummy; (b) A test of the relation between the squared residuals from a re-
gression with proﬁtability as a dependent variable, and a group aﬃliation dummy; (c) Tests
of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance comparing the distributions of proﬁt volatility among
group-aﬃliated and nonaﬃliated ﬁrms; (d) A test comparing whether the distribution of prof-
itability among group ﬁrms is more skew than among nongroup ﬁrms because groups bail out
member ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress and should therefore include fewer poorly performing
members; (e) A test derived from Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha (1996) of the extent to
which shocks to proﬁtability are smoothed through changes in dividends received; (f) A two-
dimensional stochastic dominance test of the hypothesis that group-aﬃliated ﬁrms exhibit
both low proﬁtability and low proﬁt volatility relative to nongroup ﬁrms. For Japanese
groups, evidence of risk sharing (low proﬁt volatility) was found in all of the tests except the
last.ronment according to these tests, groups in most emerging markets do not.
Furthermore, there seems to be little relation between the extent of devel-
opment of a country’s ﬁnancial system and the extent of mutual insurance
provided by groups. In Japan too, there is little diﬀerence between mea-
sures of mutual insurance within corporate groups before and after the lib-
eralization of Japan’s ﬁnancial markets in the 1980s.
The simple proﬁtability statistics reported in table 9.3 suggest that in
many cases, group-aﬃliated ﬁrms outperform their unaﬃliated counter-
parts. More detailed econometric studies (controlling for various ﬁrm and
group characteristics) also conﬁrm that group membership is often associ-
ated with superior performance (See Chang and Choi 1988 for Korea;
Keister 1998 for China; Khanna and Palepu 1999, 2000 for Chile and
India).
By contrast, the raw ﬁgures for Japan, suggesting lower proﬁt rates for
group-aﬃliated ﬁrms, are conﬁrmed by a long list of empirical studies.
Caves and Uekusa (1976), Nakatani (1984), Odagiri (1992), Weinstein and
Yafeh (1995, 1998), and Kang and Shivdasani (1999) all ﬁnd that members
of bank-centered Japanese groups underperform otherwise comparable
unaﬃliated ﬁrms. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) also point out that growth
rates among group-aﬃliated companies were never higher than growth
rates of corresponding unaﬃliated companies.
A plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that Japanese group
ﬁrms do something other than proﬁt maximization, perhaps in accordance
with the interests of inﬂuential creditors (banks) within the group. We con-
clude that, in terms of risk and return trade-oﬀs,  Japanese corporate
groups appear to diﬀer from most of the corporate groups elsewhere.
For further discussion of the reasons for low proﬁt rates among group
ﬁrms see Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, 200–03). Okazaki (2001) ﬁnds that, in
the prewar period, ﬁrms aﬃliated with zaibatsu exhibited higher proﬁt
rates than comparable unaﬃliated ﬁrms, in contrast to the postwar period.
9.4 Long-Term Changes and Prospects
This section begins with an evaluation of the impact of corporate groups
on the development of the Japanese economy in the long run. It then pro-
ceeds to a discussion of the evolution of the groups over time, continues to
discuss the relative performance of group members in the 1990s, and con-
cludes with an examination of the weakening of cross-shareholding and
banking ties.
9.4.1 Long-Run Development of Industries
One (admittedly rough) way to evaluate the impact of corporate groups
on the development of industries is to compare the growth rates of indus-
274 Yishay Yafehtries in Japan and the United States, and to relate the diﬀerences to group
presence. Using industry-level growth rates (drawn from Carlin and Mayer
1999), table 9.4 displays the fastest growing and declining industries in the
United States and Japan for the period 1970–1995.
In terms of capital formation, the same industries lead the list in both
countries; in terms of growth of value added, there are some diﬀerences.
Declining industries in the two countries also are quite similar. For the pur-
pose of the present discussion, there is nothing to suggest that the growth
rates of Japanese industries where group presence is more pronounced is
substantially diﬀerent than in the United States. Note that it is diﬃcult to
calculate the correlation between industry growth and group market share
because the industry deﬁnitions Carlin and Mayer used are somewhat
diﬀerent than the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) used in
table 9.2.
9.4.2 Industry Location
Group aﬃliation data drawn from the 1994 Keiretsu no Kenkyu suggest
that group members were spread across many sectors, with their presence
more pronounced in the chemicals, machinery, and electronics industries,
much as in earlier periods. The diﬀerences in size between group and non-
group ﬁrms documented earlier seem to have persisted into the 1990s, and,
much as in earlier periods, group ﬁrms are still somewhat more leveraged
(table 9.5). There is no reason to believe groups have reorganized so as to
focus more on certain industries, and there is little evidence that the struc-
ture of Japan’s corporate groups has changed signiﬁcantly in other ways, at
least until the mid-1990s.
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Table 9.4 Growth of Industries in Japan and the United States, 1970–1995
Japan United States
Fastest growing industries
Measured by capital Electrical machinery; transporta- Plastic; electrical machinery; 
formation tion equipment; nonelectrical  nonelectrical machinery; 
machinery; metals; chemicals  chemicals (nonindustrial); 
(nonindustrial) chemicals (industrial)
Measured by growth of  Tobacco; plastic; printing; electri- Electrical machinery; profes-
value added cal machinery; chemicals  sional goods; transportation 
(nonindustrial) equipment; machinery; metals
Slowest growing industries
Measured by capital  Wood; footwear; leather; apparel;  Iron; shipbuilding; tobacco; 
formation shipbuilding footwear; leather
Measured by growth of  Iron; wood; shipbuilding; textile;  Wood; footwear; leather; ap-
value added furniture parel; shipbuilding
Source: Carlin and Mayer (1999).9.4.3 Performance in the 1990s
Table 9.5 suggests that small diﬀerences in returns on assets (ROA) are
still present in the 1990s, with group-aﬃliated companies being somewhat
less proﬁtable than unaﬃliated ﬁrms. The table also suggests that the char-
acterization of group members as less volatile appears to hold for the 1990s
as well.
Diﬀerences in proﬁtability between group members and unaﬃliated
ﬁrms are clearly observed in the multivariate regressions displayed in table
9.6. It is also interesting to note that while the average group-aﬃliated com-
pany experienced (nominal) asset growth of about 10 percent between
1991 and 2000, the assets of nongroup companies grew, on average, at
about 17 percent during the same period. Thus, risk and return diﬀerences
between group members and other companies seem to hold in the 1990s as
well.
To the extent that performance diﬀerences in earlier years were due to
bank monopoly power, leading to non-proﬁt-maximization among group
ﬁrms (see Weinstein and Yafeh 1998), the evidence from the 1990s may at-
test to continued inﬂuence of banks on remaining clients, despite ongoing
liberalization. Low proﬁtability of group members as a result of low risk
strategies may still explain some of the diﬀerences in the 1990s, as the low
volatility of proﬁts suggests. The banking crisis may have had a negative
eﬀect on ﬁrms with ties to ailing banks and is another possible explanation
for these ﬁndings (see Kang and Stulz 2000). Finally, it is quite possible that
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Table 9.5 Corporate Groups, 1991–2000
Group Firms Other Firms
Mean SDa Mean SDa
Number of observationsb 4150 2883
Total assets (¥ billions) 287** 566 191 494
Debt assets 0.57** 0.17 0.54 0.26
ROA (%) 3.8** 3.5 4.0 4.5
Standard deviation of ROA (%)c 2.0** 1.2 2.4 1.5
Operating proﬁt (% assets) 3.0 3.3 3.2 4.6
Ordinary proﬁt (% assets)d 2.9 3.5 3.1 5.4
Note: Group aﬃliation is based on the 1994 Keiretsu no Kenkyu deﬁnition. Note that the per-
centage of group-aﬃliated companies in this sample is somewhat higher than in earlier stud-
ies.
aStandard deviation.
bTotal number of observations over the entire period.
cMean (within ﬁrm) standard deviation of ROA.
dOrdinary proﬁt is total proﬁt (operating and other income, including capital gains, losses,
and depreciation) after interest expenses.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.some of the relatively poor performance of group members in the 1990s is
due to the phenomenon of good ﬁrms ending their long-term ties with their
main bank and possibly with their bank-centered group (see Hoshi and
Kashyap 2001, 241–48, and further discussion below).
9.4.4 Cross-Shareholding
The ongoing recession in Japan and the decline in share prices may have
made cross-shareholding arrangements costly to maintain, and the weak-
ness of the group’s main banks may have also contributed to the disinte-
gration of the groups. At the same time, it is possible to argue that mutual
risk-sharing arrangements within the groups are particularly valuable in
the present economic conditions.
Suzuki (1998) reports that the sale of equity stakes held by corporations
for long periods of time had not been a widespread phenomenon at the
time he conducted his research. However, Okabe (2001) shows that sub-
stantial divestment of shares has been going on within the corporate
groups since the late 1990s, especially by nonﬁnancial corporations. His
main ﬁnding is that nonﬁnancial corporations have reduced cross-
shareholding ties with ﬁnancial institutions substantially, whereas other
forms of cross-shareholding within groups (among ﬁnancial institutions,
between ﬁnancial institutions and nonﬁnancial corporations, and among
nonﬁnancial corporations) have remained virtually unchanged. For ex-
ample, shares held by ﬁnancial institutions as part of cross-shareholding
arrangements remained roughly unchanged between 1987 and 1997, and
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Table 9.6 Proﬁtability Regressions, 1991–2000
Operating Ordinary 
ROAP r oﬁts/Assets Proﬁts/Assets
Group dummy –0.38** (0.09) –0.30** (0.08) –0.24** (0.09)
Debt/assets –5.75** (0.51) –6.19** (0.35) –10.37** (1.48)
Fixed assets/total assets –5.64** (0.39) –5.35** (0.40) –6.62** (0.40)
Log (sales) 0.56** (0.06) 0.57** (0.06) 0.69** (0.10)
Standard deviation of ROA –0.14** (0.06) –0.24** (0.06) –0.24** (0.07)
Percentage of shares held by
Top 12 shareholders 0.011 (0.004) 0.015** (0.005) 0.017** (0.005)
Individuals 0.05** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01)
Financial institutions 0.004 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) 0.004 (0.006)
Nonﬁnancial ﬁrms –0.09** (0.03) –0.06 (0.03) –0.09 (0.04)
R2 0.29 0.28 0.41
Note: The dependent variables are measures of proﬁtability and the regressions are OLS us-
ing pooled data with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors reported in parentheses.
The group aﬃliation dummy equals 1 for ﬁrms that are classiﬁed as group members using the
1994 Keiretsu no Kenkyu deﬁnition. In all three cases N is 7,033, and year dummies and in-
dustry dummies are used.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.then declined from about 8 percent of all shares to 6 percent in 1999. This
reﬂects a decrease of similar magnitude in shareholding by ﬁnancial insti-
tutions in both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial companies. By contrast, share-
holding by nonﬁnancial corporations declined somewhat in the early 1990s
and then, during 1995–1999, declined from about 9 percent of total mar-
ket value to 4.5 percent. This is accounted for primarily by a 4.1 percent-
age-point fall in shares held by corporations in ﬁnancial institutions (Ok-
abe 2001, table 2). A Nippon Life Insurance (2001) study, which is the
source of Okabe’s ﬁgures, conﬁrms more broadly that the reduction in
cross-shareholding is a phenomenon of the second half of the 1990s and
that it is common to all major corporate groups. Some data are in table 9.7.
In spite of these trends, comparisons of membership in presidents’ clubs
show little evidence of group disintegration between 1989 and 1999. It is
important to note also that these ﬁgures are somewhat sensitive to the def-
inition of group aﬃliation and cross- or stable shareholding ties.
9.4.5 Banking Ties and Mergers
The trend of decreasing cross-shareholding ratios, especially between
nonﬁnancial corporations and banks, is likely to be exacerbated by ﬁrms
deciding to discontinue their long-term relations with the group’s main
banks. There is now no doubt that this phenomenon, documented initially
by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1993), and more recently in Ander-
son and Makhija (1999) and in Miyajima and Arikawa (2001), is of large
magnitude.
The merger wave among ﬁnancial institutions that cuts across tradi-
tional group lines is another factor that is likely to destabilize the existing
group structure. For example, mergers between DKB and Fuji banks (to-
gether with the Industrial Bank of Japan), and between Sakura (Mitsui)
and Sumitomo banks, could potentially lead to mergers of their clients’
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Table 9.7 Trends in Cross-Shareholding of Major Groups (%)
Groupb 1987 1997 2000 Change 1997–2000a
Mitsubishi 14.8 14.0 11.3 –19.3
Sumitomo 13.4 11.3 8.9 –21.3
Mitsui 10.2 7.6 5.1 –32.9
Fuji 11.2 7.7 4.6 –40.3
DKB 9.1 7.9 6.2 –21.5
Sanwa 9.3 7.3 4.9 –32.9
Source: Nippon Life Insurance (2001), table 5.
Note:Average percentage of shares of a member ﬁrm cross-held by other group ﬁrms. The ﬁg-
ures refer to cross-shareholding only, as identiﬁed by Nippon Life Insurance, as opposed to
all stable shareholding within the group.
aPercentage change in cross shareholding from 1997 to 2000.
bGroup ﬁrms as identiﬁed by Nippon Life Insurance.ﬁrms. An early-2002 example of this is the merger talks between the marine
and ﬁre insurance companies of the Mitsui and Sumitomo groups. Mitsui
Chemical and Sumitomo Chemical merged in 1998, and NKK, part of the
Fuji group, formed a strategic alliance with Kawasaki Steel of the DKB
group. It will certainly alter the previous situation in which no group con-
tains two competing ﬁrms, and no bank serves as main bank to competing
companies.
9.4.6 Summary
It is clear that Japan’s corporate groups have been changing, and that the
bank-ﬁrm (equity and debt) ties which were at their core, have been sub-
stantially weakened. One telling indicator of a declining importance of
groups is the cessation of publication of two main data sources on groups
(Keiretsu no Kenkyu ceased publication in 1998 and Kigyo Keiretsu Soran
in 2000). This decline in corporate groups appears to be associated with a
general move towards a more market-based ﬁnancial system in Japan
(Hoshi and Kashyap 1999) and may even have contributed to the decline in
Japanese stock prices. Yet it would be ridiculous to argue that the miserable
stock returns are simply due to dumping of shares formerly held within
corporate groups. The unwinding of cross-shareholdings should con-
tribute to market liquidity, although this eﬀect is hard to assess given the
deteriorating macroeconomic conditions.
A decrease in stable shareholding within corporate groups is likely to in-
crease the likelihood of hostile takeovers. Indeed, a few takeovers were ob-
served in Japan in the late 1990s (Yafeh 2000), but none involved a core
group company.
9.5 Conclusion
Corporate groups in Japan are undergoing signiﬁcant change reﬂected
in declining cross-shareholding, as well as in weakened main bank rela-
tionships. The consolidation of banks across groups is likely to accelerate
this trend, making former main bank relationships obsolete. If groups were
ever an impediment to structural change, perhaps most notably as hin-
drances to hostile takeovers and market-based corporate governance, they
are unlikely to constitute a major obstacle in the future.4
For all the attention Japanese groups attracted in the last third of the
twentieth century, not much is going to be missed from their demise, at
least in terms of the economic roles they played. Even the mutual insurance
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4. Peek and Rosengren (2002) express a diﬀerent view, arguing that loans by ﬁnancial in-
stitutions within groups impede “creative destruction” by prolonging the life of weak corpo-
rate borrowers. Although long-term bank-ﬁrm relations may prevent some bankruptcies of
ﬁrms that are no longer viable, it is not clear that corporate groups substantially exacerbate
this tendency.provided within corporate groups is likely to decline in importance, as
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital will lose some of its value and ﬁnancial mar-
kets become ever more developed.
Similarly, the corporate governance roles allegedly played by large share-
holders and ﬁnancial institutions within the corporate groups are likely to
be replaced by new, perhaps more market-oriented mechanisms, guaran-
teeing the eﬃcient operations of ﬁrms. Thus, limited economic impor-
tance, combined with little political clout, suggest that Japan’s corporate
groups are unlikely to constitute an impediment to future changes in ﬁ-
nancial markets and corporate strategy.
Despite the large literature on corporate groups in Japan and elsewhere,
the phenomenon of business groups still has many unanswered questions.
Why is it that groups are observed in so many countries in early stages of
their economic development? What is the most important reason for their
existence? Why is the mutual insurance function of groups more important
in Japan and a few other countries than in most emerging markets? How
do groups evolve over time, and does their development pattern provide
any evidence on their raison d’être? Will the Japanese groups provide the
ﬁrst example of groups that end their lives peacefully, or will government
intervention be needed? These are only some of the questions on corporate
groups that await further research.
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